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Chapter 1  
Introduction: The Medico-Legal Landscape 
In delivering his opinion, or explaining the cause of death, the surgeon’s narrative 
should be simple and candid; let him use as few technical terms as possible, both 
for the better information of the jury, and to avoid giving a lawyer an opportunity 
of embarrassing him. 
William Dease, Remarks on Medical Jurisprudence; Intended for the General 
Information of Juries and Young Surgeons (Dublin: James Reilly, 1793), p. 22. 
 
In a scenario replayed countless times in modern fiction, a hapless doctor sits transfixed in a 
courtroom witness box, pinned like a bug to a board by the questioning of a just-barely-civil defence 
barrister determined to undermine their credibility, weaken their evidence and ensure the client’s 
acquittal. This, it seems, was a state of affairs not unknown to the medical profession of the late 
eighteenth century, as the warning issued by the Irish surgeon William Dease (c.1752–1798) attests. 
Though he was speaking of the practices he had witnessed at first hand in Dublin, there was little 
difference to the English courts of the day, as noted by the Somerset-based physician Samuel Farr 
(1741–1795) in his earlier textbook: “… it is to be hoped, that this little treatise will meet the 
attention of judges and lawyers … and that they will be enabled to correct the errors of coroners, or 
ignorant surgeons, who may have been misled in the depositions they give in.”1 But what do we 
really know about the encounters between medicine and law, doctors and lawyers, in the criminal 
courts of the past? How and why did medical professionals enter the courtroom; what did they do to 
get there and what reception did they receive? This book will situate doctors in their rightful place as 
contributors to the investigation of crime, as part of a criminal justice system that evolved over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to create the regularised policing and legal 
structures so familiar today.  
The book is conceived primarily as a contribution to the historiography of criminal justice in England 
and Wales. As such, it is broadly concerned with the history of the formal systems of practice 
directed at deterring, detecting and punishing crime.2 But it engages this far-reaching field of study 
by focusing on the intersection of the social history of law and crime with medical history. Legal 
historians examine the common law and legal process, in order to understand how and why these 
embodiments of the state-controlled administration of justice adapt and evolve in response to 
internal and external stimuli.3 Crime historians adopt a complementary perspective, taking as their 
main focus of study the individuals who engaged with the criminal justice system and the terms on 
which they did so, to explain how people in the past understood crime and criminality and either 
engaged in criminal conduct or attempted to manage it.4 The present study examines the history of 
crime and legal process through the lens provided by one group of historical actors, medical 
professionals who gave evidence in criminal proceedings. They are the means of illuminating the 
developing methods and personnel associated with investigating and prosecuting crime in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England and Wales, when two linchpins of modern society, 
centralised policing and the adversarial criminal trial, emerged and matured.5 It is devoted to two 




central questions: what did medical practitioners contribute to the investigation of serious violent 
crime in the period 1700 to 1914, and what impact did this have on the process of criminal justice?   
Criminal justice historians — a term used here to include all scholars who study law and crime in 
historical context — are interested in specific groups of actors and particular practices. Thus, the 
scholarship of the past thirty years has shed considerable light on offenders and victims; juries; law 
officers such as police, magistrates, lawyers, judges and coroners; criminal trials; and punishment 
including execution, transportation and imprisonment. Key themes that serve to unite these broad 
areas of study have emerged, including the relationship between gender, law and crime, examined 
most often through women’s experience of the criminal justice system;6 and the changing attitudes 
to violence revealed through criminal justice proceedings. Probably no form of criminal behaviour 
has been subject to more scrutiny than homicide (a term used here to denote three species of fatal 
interpersonal violence, murder, manslaughter and infanticide), as historians have sought to identify 
the incidence and characteristics of violence in the past.7 Similarly, the history of rape is integral to 
understanding contemporary beliefs about sexual assault.8 The prosecution of homicide and rape, as 
crimes against the person, involved some estimation of physical harm done to a victim, yet medical 
professionals have for the most part been excluded from British criminal justice historiography. This 
represents a significant omission given the observation with which this chapter began. By the late 
eighteenth century, the medical contribution to the prosecution of serious crimes against the person 
had become so common as to merit both publications on the subject and Dease’s note of caution to 
young practitioners who might be called into court: they must be wary of lawyers but considerate of 
jurors.9 
A great deal of scholarly attention has concentrated on England in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when “legal, procedural and cultural changes crystallized modern attitudes” to violence 
and crime,10 stimulated the adoption of professionalised methods of policing and prosecution,11 
encouraged more reliance on lawyers in criminal trials and inspired the development of evidentiary 
rules.12 Legal historian Lindsay Farmer has noted that as a result of these innovations, trials became 
longer and more contentious, began to rely more on expert evidence, and allowed more influence to 
accrue to “the personalities of the lawyers, detectives and scientific experts that came to dominate” 
legal proceedings.13 The same might be said of the coroner’s inquest, the other jurisdiction where 
the evidence of a medical practitioner was most likely to be required. 
Historical interest in the inquest as a legal process began in the late 1950s,14 but doctors and the 
evidence they provided have escaped thorough scrutiny despite the fact that the inquest’s primary 
function was the investigation of sudden death — which by definition created a decision-making 
process to establish cause and manner of death: natural, accident, suicide or homicide.15 Detailed 
research on inquisitions, the formal records of inquest findings, led to the conclusion that medical 
determination of cause of death, as opposed to lay assessment, was relatively under-developed in 
relation to Continental practices though becoming more usual by the early nineteenth century.16 A 
later series of important books on medico-scientific expertise considered medical evidence in both 
inquests and the criminal courts, but focused on public accountability and scientific objectivity rather 
than matters of routine practice.17 Thus, despite the pioneering work of Catherine Crawford and 
Jennifer Ward on the institutional development of forensic medicine,18 few academic studies have 
examined medical practitioners as ordinary actors in the criminal justice system.19   




The fact that forensic practices are embedded in socio-legal context was highlighted by an important 
collection of essays, Legal Medicine in History, which emphasized the “formative influence of legal 
systems on medico-legal knowledge and practice” through a series of case studies.20 Crawford’s 
seminal chapter presented a persuasive interpretation of the slow development of “medico-legal 
science” in early modern England as a product of the framework created by the common law 
tradition of jury trial and oral evidence. Unlike the procedures created by the Roman-canon legal 
system, there was no requirement for the testimony of experts, written or otherwise, and hence no 
ready-made point of entry for medical practitioners to the English courtroom. Crawford noted that 
medical testimony was often sought by “English coroners, magistrates and trial participants” before 
1800, but dated the beginnings of legal acceptance of medical expertise to the nineteenth century, 
thereby explaining the late development of forensic medicine as a learned science.21 In Crawford’s 
interpretation, the law led and medico-legal practice followed. Although subsequent studies by Julia 
Rudolph and Carol Loar have dispelled the assumption that early modern death investigations placed 
little reliance on medical evidence,22 there has, to date, been no study of medico-legal practice 
across precisely the period that historians of crime have identified as crucial to the development of 
English criminal procedure, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.   
Crawford’s research firmly linked legal history to the social history of medicine, a third area of study 
directly relevant to this book. Engaged in what is now a flourishing historical sub-discipline, social 
historians of medicine examine all aspects of health, illness and medical practice from a range of 
perspectives including the political, socio-economic and cultural; important areas of focus include 
health, disease, institutions, patients and the development of the various professions involved in 
medicine.23 The concept of the ‘medical marketplace’, used to describe the variety of medical 
provision available to sick people in the past, is particularly interesting, as historians have identified 
eighteenth-century changes brought about by a burgeoning consumer society as factors that 
expanded both the demand for and supply of medical services. The very diversity of the available 
provision suggests, however, that “historians should … think of the markets for medical goods and 
services rather than a generalized image of the medical market or marketplace.”24 While the medical 
market has been used by historians in relation to health care, the historiography of this important 
concept has largely overlooked a very different yet parallel market for medical services: the market 
created by the needs of the English legal system. The service offered was not health care but crime 
investigation; the consumers were not sick people but legal officials; there were no patients, only 
victims. This relationship evolved, like the traditional medical market, on the basis of supply and 
demand but, in a departure from the customary model of medical care, the ‘commercializing’ 
marketplace in which medical practitioners were located was that defined by the requirements of 
criminal justice administration.  
It is therefore important to recognise a distinction between academic scholarship and what the 
average practitioner actually did. The former is best described as the body of systematic knowledge 
known as forensic medicine: during the course of the nineteenth century an international group of 
university lecturers wrote textbooks that came to define and establish the intellectual standards for 
this emerging medical specialism.25 The terms ‘legal medicine’ and ‘medical jurisprudence’ were 
often used interchangeably to signify the same scholarly field: the application of medical science to 
legal problems. But the hands-on forensic activities that medical practitioners actually undertook are 
more accurately understood as ‘medico-legal work’, a term that embraces all possible applications of 
medical knowledge for legal purposes but which in criminal cases most often involved some form of 




body examination, of the living or the dead or, less frequently, an assessment of mental capacity. 
Both terms are informed by the presumption that forensic medicine and its practical mechanisms —
that is, forensic practices — exemplify the use of medical evidence to establish facts in aid of legal 
decision-making processes.  
Medico-legal work in England and Wales pre-dates the academic discipline of forensic medicine. 
Thus, one of the main tasks of this book will be to identify its form and scope and to show how 
embedded in and responsive to wider patterns in crime and criminal justice administration it was. 
Essentially, medico-legal work developed in tandem with and was shaped by the needs of two 
evolving processes: pre-trial investigative procedures dominated successively by coroners, 
magistrates and the police; and criminal trials in which lawyers moved from the periphery to the 
centre of courtroom proceedings. In bringing together for the first time four groups of specialists — 
doctors, coroners, lawyers and police officers — this study offers a new interpretation of the 
processes that shaped the modern criminal justice system. 
 
Medico-Legal History: The Story So Far  
The important role played by medicine in legal settings since the medieval period has been clearly 
established by a range of medical and legal historians who, since the early studies of T. R. Forbes, 
have used inquisitions, legal manuals and criminal trial accounts to consider issues of civic concern 
— chiefly death investigation, the most common focus of medico-legal practice. Sara Butler has 
demonstrated the importance of medical evidence in medieval inquests;26 a larger body of work has 
examined the early modern period to show that medico-legal practice, albeit sporadic, occurred in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century death investigations;27 and Orna Alyagon Darr has published a 
novel study of medical testimony in English witch trials.28 It is clear that the principles of forensic 
medicine were visible in some parts of England by the middle of the eighteenth century:29 from 
around 1750 uncertainties in medical testimony gave English courts a justifiable reason to acquit 
women accused of newborn child murder,30 and medical witnesses on insanity began to venture into 
the courtroom.31 Institutional progress occurred in the first third of the nineteenth century, when 
forensic medicine offered medical reformers a particularly useful means by which to demonstrate 
the power of scientific medicine, giving the profession a more public importance and authority. The 
first substantial English-language textbooks were published and a periodical literature appeared, the 
Society of Apothecaries made training in forensic medicine a condition of medical qualification from 
1 January 1831 and Guy’s Hospital established a lectureship in the subject (to which the soon-to-be 
famed toxicologist Alfred Swaine Taylor (1806–1880) was appointed), and in 1836 the government 
introduced statutory fees for medical testimony at inquests.32  
Poisoning and suicide became increasingly important subjects of medico-legal consideration as the 
incidence of both rose during the nineteenth century;33 and so did child sexual abuse, although the 
medical contribution had a rather less positive impact on trial outcomes.34 The mental and physical 
characteristics of newborn child murder, or infanticide, became one of the most frequent issues on 
which medical evidence was sought, but both were medically and legally contentious.35 Toxicology 
and psychiatry emerged as key areas of potential collaboration but also of conflict between doctors 
and lawyers, who did not necessarily share a common conception of certainty, proof or free will.36 It 
is perhaps unsurprising, then, that these were the areas of medical practice most closely associated 




with the rise of the expert witness, a figure that appeared in the late eighteenth century as a 
uniquely qualified individual permitted to give evidence about both fact and opinion on the basis of 
professional experience. This figure, linked closely to the notion of ‘expertise’ and seen as a 
potentially partisan advocate within the adversarial criminal trial structure rather than an impartial 
purveyor of accurate information,37 is typically distinguished from more usual medical witnesses in 
the historiography. The expert witness relies on specialised knowledge developed during the course 
of a professional career and can thus be called to give evidence about matters that they have not 
witnessed directly, in order to offer opinions about causation. Other medical witnesses, by contrast, 
testify only to their direct observations and the interpretations they draw from them.38 
The most dramatic evidence of the status and knowledge claims of forensic medicine and medical 
witnesses was apparent in criminal trials. Anne Crowther and Brenda White noted that in England 
and Scotland “a small group with special experience, usually drawn from the hospitals, universities, 
or police surgeons, provided an unofficial cadre of forensic experts. By the end of the century, 
although general practitioners still performed autopsies, particularly in remote areas, most courts 
preferred a specialist”.39 So, after 1900 a smaller group of ‘experts’ concerned themselves with the 
criminal aspects of forensic medicine.40 At the same time, government support turned to the 
application of science (physics, chemistry and biology) to crime detection as part of a central 
reorganisation of policing.41 The emerging historiographical consensus was thus that forensic 
medicine in England advanced from informal early modern origins through a period of expansion 
and consolidation in the early nineteenth century, only to become the poor relation of forensic 
science a century later.  
New scholarship has begun to explore scientific policing and the twentieth-century separation of 
forensic science from forensic medicine,42 but there has as yet been no systematic investigation of 
the way in which forensic medicine came to rely on a small group of ‘experts’ (who have themselves 
featured disproportionately in the historiography) or, indeed, of the individuals engaged in routine 
forensic practice in any period. The medico-legal history of the British Isles remains inadequate and 
under-developed because, quite apart from the intellectual focus on toxicology, insanity and 
infanticide to the near exclusion of more typical cases (most victims of homicide were adults who 
died from head injuries or stabbing),43 the geographical spotlight has tended to rest upon London 
and trials held at its central criminal court, the Old Bailey. This (one suspects) is at least partly 
because of the attention that crime historians level on London, as a result of its vast archival riches. 
Less astonishing perhaps is the fact that forensic practice is almost completely unexplored in the 
historiography of crime in Wales which, though less extensive than that of England or Scotland, is 
beginning to grow.44 Social historians of medicine, meanwhile, have largely been interested in health 
care in the Principality;45 legal historians in the law in Wales.46 But given that England and Wales 
have been united under a common administrative and legal system since the mid-sixteenth century, 
yet have very separate socio-cultural identities, the investigation of medico-legal practice in Wales is 
merited both in its own right and as a foundation for future comparative work. Furthermore, such a 
study opens up to exploration essential questions suggested by Peter King, who has warned against 
the assumption that central initiatives were simply applied nationwide in toto. Instead, he asks 
historians to consider the ways in which law and the practice of justice “can be explored by 
contrasting the central and the marginal and by analysing the relationship between them”, since it is 
likely that in many respects “the operation of justice was remade as much from the bottom up as 
from the centre down”.47  




A new generation of historians has adopted the regional approach advocated by King: in the past 
decade more doctoral theses exploiting records produced outside London to examine medico-legal 
topics have appeared than at any previous time. Fisher’s work on the office of coroner provided a 
truly national perspective,48 while Daniel Grey and Victoria Bates compared London with regions in 
the west of England in their work on infanticide and child sexual assault, respectively.49 Further 
afield, Elaine Farrell’s study of infanticide in Ireland focused in part on medical evidence in coroners’ 
courts;50 and forensic practices in Scotland were examined by Nicholas Duvall and Tim Siddons, who 
carefully acknowledged the wider institutional, investigative and geographical networks in which 
Scottish medico-legal work was ensconced.51 These studies have developed their arguments with a 
close attention to and regard for legal practices, embracing an interdisciplinary approach that draws 
on the sources and methods of the history of medicine, law and crime. In so doing, they have helped 
to bring historical forensic practices into criminal justice decision-making structures, siting medico-
legal work within an integrated investigative process.52 The present study contributes to the strands 
of analysis developed by these scholars, and extends them. In adopting a wider regional comparison 
across a significantly longer period of time, this book will identify the contribution made by medical 
practitioners to the investigation of serious violent crime and establish its transformative impact on 
the process of criminal justice.  
 
Criminal Justice: Process and Procedure  
The process of organising a criminal case began when a violent crime was identified, involving the 
collaboration of doctors, coroners, lawyers and the police in the service of the principal branches of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century criminal justice: law enforcement and the court system. A large 
supporting cast of lay witnesses, magistrates, jurors and judges were also essential contributors to 
this system. Historians of law and crime have long been interested in the development of criminal 
investigation and court procedures,53 but have directed little attention to doctors even in relation to 
the coroner’s inquest.54 Histories of the office of coroner, by contrast, tend not to examine criminal 
justice procedure as a fundamental attribute of the developing importance of medical knowledge at 
inquests.55 For this book, however, it is important to recognise the intersecting roles played by these 
disparate groups, as a foundation for the analysis presented in later chapters. Figure 1.1 
demonstrates this relationship as a series of separate yet linked processes that proceeded in a 
forward direction, from pre-trial hearing by a coroner and/or magistrate to a criminal trial presided 
over by a judge and jury. Eyewitnesses and jurors were essential to crime investigation, prosecution 
and trial throughout the period, but their contribution became progressively more passive as 
professionals assumed a greater responsibility in the practices of criminal justice. The holders of 
ancient office — judges, magistrates and coroners (of whom until the nineteenth century only the 
judges could be defined as professionals) were joined by doctors, lawyers and finally the uniformed 
police, thereby establishing the modern system of criminal investigation.   
<FIGURE 1.1 HERE> 
The investigation of a crime was initially reactive: a criminal case began when a lay witness gave 
information or made a formal complaint to a coroner, magistrate (also known as a justice of the 
peace or JP) or parish constable. A system largely unaltered for centuries began to change rapidly in 
the nineteenth century when the ‘new police’,56 organised at county or borough level, replaced 




parish constables and in larger towns police courts staffed by stipendiary magistrates superseded 
amateur JPs. Although the new police were primarily a preventive force, they swiftly took on a 
central role in investigating serious crimes against the person: victims and witnesses turned to the 
police as the appropriate authority and logical first step in the process of criminal justice. However, 
the police shared that position with another group: it was entirely typical for members of the public 
to send for the police and a doctor following the discovery of a crime such as homicide. Early police 
methods in such cases perhaps differed little from those of “the more conscientious and determined 
of their predecessors,” in that they relied largely on information gathering, circulation and storage 
techniques pioneered in mid-eighteenth-century London by the Bow Street magistrates.57 However, 
the new police joined coroners and magistrates as an important source of demand for medico-legal 
knowledge, and part of what this book will do, is demonstrate how that relationship worked. To that 
end, Appendix 3 provides a chronological summary of the introduction of the new police in the areas 
relevant to the project (see Aims, Methods and Sources, below).  
Coroners were under no legal imperative to seek medical evidence at inquests, although clearly 
some did so, before a more systematic practice began to develop in the eighteenth century under 
the stimulus of published manuals designed to establish clear protocols. In 1761 the senior coroner 
for Middlesex, lawyer Edward Umfreville (c.1702–1786), advised coroners to have a surgeon present 
in all cases of suspected homicide. If the parish surgeon refused to attend without payment, as had 
been known to happen, then the churchwardens and overseers could be directed to send a surgeon 
to attend the inquest, to open and inspect the body and give evidence for the crown.58 In cases of 
homicide, the inquest verdict recorded in an inquisition had the status of an indictment: any named 
individual had to stand trial. At the same time, numerous manuals devoted to the duties of JPs 
instructed magistrates on the different categories of homicide; but JPs were similarly under no legal 
obligation to obtain medical evidence, merely “the best evidence that may be had.”59 Common 
sense dictates that suspected murder made the need for medical evidence obvious; and the cases 
examined here demonstrate that it did indeed become a regular component of homicide trials early 
in the eighteenth century. There was no reason not to call upon a doctor’s skill in a potentially 
capital case: coroners and magistrates had the power to compel witnesses to testify in criminal cases 
by entering them into recognizances, usually about £20 at mid-century but nearer £40 by 1800. If 
the witness failed to appear in court, the money was forfeit and few individuals could afford such a 
penalty. If doctors wanted to avoid getting involved in a case, therefore, they had to do so before an 
inquest or committal hearing commenced.  
The coroner’s main obligation ended with the inquest, but if there was no complainant it was his 
duty to prosecute the suspected party.60 Magistrates never acted as prosecutors, but could depose 
additional witnesses until the court was due to convene, in an effort to strengthen a case. Although 
the evidence taken at inquest or before a magistrate in the same case was normally the same, there 
was a crucial distinction: inquests inquired into the facts of a death and therefore heard evidence for 
and against a suspect, but committal hearings inquired only into the evidence needed to prove the 
felony.61 Information flowed informally between the two, however, in the form of the eyewitnesses, 
doctors and constables. Following the introduction of the new police, the senior investigating officer 
generally appeared at both proceedings where, increasingly, the accused made use of the services of 
a solicitor. When an individual was committed for trial the depositions from both hearings were sent 
to the assize court and there used by the prosecutor to construct a narrative designed to guide a jury 
to convict. 




Before a case got to court, however, a grand jury comprising 23 magistrates heard the prosecution 
evidence from the mouths of the prosecutor and witnesses. If the presumptive evidence against the 
accused was sufficiently convincing, they deemed the indictment a true bill; in the contrary case, no 
bill. Suspects who had also been committed by a coroner were tried first upon indictment or, if no 
bill was found, solely upon the inquisition.62 The actual trial took place before a judge and jury of 
twelve men. Judges took notes of the oral evidence, sometimes put questions to witnesses (for their 
own elucidation or to aid a prisoner undefended by counsel), and finally summed up the evidence 
for the jury, noting any particularly relevant points of fact or law. In 1822, these procedures were 
summarised by Charles Cottu (1778–1849), a French observer, who raised two additional points of 
interest: surgeons tended to give their evidence just before the defence witnesses; and prisoners 
and prosecutors often had a barrister to speak for them at trial, although this was more common in 
the provinces than in London.63  
Legal historians studying the development of the criminal trial have concentrated on the emerging 
law of evidence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the adversary system, and the relationship 
between judge and jury. John Langbein and others have concluded that many of the most important 
changes identified took place during the eighteenth century, stimulated by the increasing presence 
of defence counsel.64 This became more regular in the 1730s, as judges presiding over criminal trials 
attempted to correct the imbalance between the unaided accused and prosecutions progressively 
more reliant upon solicitors and thief-takers,65 but the key turning point came in the 1780s, “when 
there was a spurt in the reported use of defence counsel.”66 T. P. Gallanis has put forward the most 
convincing explanation for the timing of this development: the decisive factor was the cessation of 
transportation to America in 1775. The principal punishments short of death then became “disease-
ridden prisons or transportation to the fledgling and dangerous colony in Australia” — unpleasant 
prospects that defendants sought to avoid by employing defence counsel.67 Furthermore, the 1780s 
was a decade of unprecedented concern about crime manifested in expanded use of the death 
penalty.68 The value of defence counsel lay in their ability to cross-examine witnesses: the defendant 
avoided making dangerous admissions during the course of trying to do so himself; also, a vigorous 
cross-examination could lead to a directed verdict, so that the accused did not have to say anything 
at all.69 
Although lawyers were slow to acknowledge it, doctors had a vital role to play in prosecuting crimes 
against the person: the prosecution had to specify and prove all the facts and circumstances that 
constituted the offence alleged, including the medical facts that supported a charge of homicide or 
rape. As successive treatises on criminal law defined crimes ever more carefully, the importance of 
medical evidence became increasingly overt in the works of the most highly respected and widely 
cited legal authors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is most apparent in treatises on 
the law of evidence. In English law, an act became a crime when two conditions were satisfied: there 
was, first, a will to do harm and secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon it.70 Medical evidence 
gained a recognized status as one of several complementary forms of necessary proof of these two 
conditions. Doctors could testify to the mental competency of the accused, to establish that they 
were of “sound discretion” and capable of forming a vicious intent; but they more frequently gave 
evidence about the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim, to help establish the act alleged. 
As stated by Brian Levack, the law of evidence in England is “essentially a law of jury control” created 
by judicial management of courtroom procedure, including decisions about what types of testimony 




to allow and the instructions given to juries.71 The modern law of evidence began to develop during 
the eighteenth century and was, according to Langbein, clearly in place by the mid-nineteenth 
century, driven by the increasing presence of lawyers in criminal trials. Judges had to control the oral 
evidence given by witnesses, the questions put to them by prosecution and defence counsel, and the 
inferences that juries were to draw from the evidence they heard. While the rapid development of 
adversary criminal procedure in the last quarter of the eighteenth century made the law of evidence 
possible,72 nothing in Langbein’s analysis suggests the impact that medical witnesses might have had 
on this process. Gallanis reached a similar conclusion about the origins of modern evidence law, but 
dated its creation to the somewhat narrower period bounded by the texts of Sir Geoffrey Gilbert 
(1754) and Thomas Starkie (1824),73 both of whom employed medicine-related examples. Prompted 
by courtroom dilemmas caused by the 1624 Infanticide Act, which inferred murder from the fact of 
concealing the birth and death of an illegitimate infant, Gilbert cited the statute in relation to “the 
elements of a civil action or criminal charge, the defenses available under it, and the proof necessary 
to sustain it.”74 Starkie discussed a number of issues that Gilbert ignored, including expert evidence, 
witnesses allowed to refresh their memory with notes made at the time of the events in question, 
and the role of lawyers in examining witnesses.75 These, as we will see, were all points of relevance 
to medical witnesses. 
The first formal statement about the role of what we now designate the expert witness was made in 
Capel Lofft’s 1791 edition of Gilbert’s Law of Evidence, noting that “in proportion as experience and 
science advocates, the uncertainty and danger from this kind of proof diminishes.”76 Using poisoning 
and infanticide as examples, Lofft put into words what had by then become typical practice in cases 
of felonious assault: “when testimonies of professional men of just estimation are affirmative, they 
may be safely credited; but when negative, they do  not amount to a disproof of a charge otherwise 
established by strong, various, and independent circumstances.”77 Thirty years later one of the most 
prolific writers of legal treatises and digests of the nineteenth century, barrister J. F. Archbold, was 
less ambiguous about what doctors contributed to criminal trials: it was their professional opinion 
on “the probable result of or consequence from certain facts already proved.”78 This was a unique 
role, because most witnesses may testify only to what they experienced at first hand, and so it 
necessitated certain protocols. Medical witnesses could not read their evidence, but they could 
refresh their memory from books or notes seen or made at the time. If however a doctor knew a fact 
only from seeing it in a book or paper, that publication had to become evidence.79 By 1922, when 
Archbold’s text had expanded to over three times its original length, all of these points appeared in 
very similar language, but the term used to denote this special witness category was “experts.”80  
From the early eighteenth century, medical men provided their opinions about the relevance of the 
facts that lay within their own “knowledge and recollection” — that is, the facts they had seen for 
themselves and, in so doing, implicitly guided the court in its decision-making responsibility. In order 
to demonstrate this, we must examine archival records to get a clear picture of actual practice. 
 
Aims, Methods and Sources  
As should by now be evident, the history of medico-legal practice sits at the intersection of three 
hitherto rather separate areas of scholarship, and this project seeks to bridge some of the gaps by 
examining medico-legal work as a contributing factor in the investigation of violent felonies,81 




particularly homicide (murder, manslaughter and infanticide) and, to a lesser extent, rape. Although 
these were by no means common offences, they provide a systematic indicator of local efforts to 
apply medico-legal principles in the courts of assize where felonies were tried, and at pre-trial stage 
in inquests and magistrates’ committal hearings. To provide a comparative, nationally representative 
analysis, medico-legal experience and practice will be examined in three distinct regions: London; 
the eight counties of the Oxford Assize Circuit stretching from Berkshire to the Welsh border; and 
Wales and its neighbouring English county, Cheshire. In order to take in the important socio-legal 
changes that affected medico-legal practice, the analysis covers the period between about 1700 and 
the First World War. The temporal focus reflects the parallel developments in the history of law, 
crime and medicine that together acted to shape medico-legal work, ensuring the inclusion of vital 
transitions in legal practices and policing systems, as well as important institutional, intellectual and 
educational developments in medicine. Appendix 1 sets out the socio-legal framework by listing the 
key pieces of legislation relevant to the themes of the book, together with related historical and 
professional milestones, in an annotated chronology intended to provide a summative overview of 
the context within which medico-legal practice occurred. By 1914 the growing demarcation between 
forensic medicine and forensic science, soon to be compounded by the effects of war, marked the 
start of a new chapter in the history of crime investigation and thus a natural ending point for this 
study. Emphasis throughout is placed on the contributions made by medical practitioners to criminal 
inquiries, to assess the intrinsic content of the medico-legal work undertaken and its impact on the 
vital processes of investigation, prosecution and trial. The aim, then, is to study medico-legal work 
within the framework of the totality of actions carried out to achieve the effective administration of 
justice.  
A series of sub-questions shape the research:  
1. What was the nature and extent of medico-legal practice across England and Wales, and how did 
this change during the period 1700-1914?  
2. Who provided medico-legal testimony, and how/why did they come to the attention of officers 
of the criminal justice system? 
3. How important were institutions such as hospitals, medical schools, workhouses, colleges and 
asylums as factors shaping the local availability of forensic knowledge and practice? 
4. What was the extent of scientific forensic practice prior to 1914, and what was its relationship to 
local medico-legal provision? 
5. How was medico-legal evidence deployed and received in the criminal courts and what impact 
did this have on the professional development of medico-legal witnesses? 
To address these questions I have adopted a methodology common to the social history of crime:82 a 
regional, quantitative and qualitative study based principally on the records created by the criminal 
justice system. The regions to be studied have been selected to facilitate direct comparison between 
London, which was at once the most populous city in the country, “the heart of legal England” and a 
centre of medical education;83 provincial regions of England; and Wales. The specific counties under 
study create a fully contiguous area that, by the early nineteenth century, encompassed some of the 
most heavily populated and economically diverse parts of England as well as a significant agricultural 




hinterland. Staffordshire was part of a broad western spine of urbanisation, and the border counties 
of Cheshire, Shropshire and Monmouthshire were uniquely situated between England and Wales.  
Figure 1.2 shows the geographical relationship of the selected counties. (There is a small gap 
between Berkshire and Middlesex occupied by Surrey and Buckinghamshire, but at 2.92 km it is 
small enough to be considered negligible.) The wide geographical scope is important for four 
reasons. Firstly, it allows cross-border investigative practices to be identified, whereby magistrates 
or the police from different counties worked cooperatively to solve a case, a medical practitioner 
from one county was called in to examine a body found in a neighbouring one, or samples were sent 
from one county to an expert in another. Secondly, this approach facilitates consideration of the 
extent to which this medical expertise was peripatetic or local.84 Thirdly, the conclusions reached will 
reflect typical practices associated with particular patterns of reported criminality, in the context of 
medical and policing provisions, and so will be more widely portable to other parts of the country 
than a study based solely on London or a single county. Finally, as a culturally separate but legally, 
medically and politically integrated part of Great Britain, Wales provides a self-contained case study 
and a contrast to England which suggests the possible importance of the concept of the periphery.85 
Three peripheries are discernible: all the areas of England outside London; Wales in relation to 
England; and rural areas located on the periphery of English and Welsh towns. What impact did 
being ‘on the periphery’ have on medico-legal practice?   
<FIGURE 1.2 HERE> 
The analysis is based on five main types of sources: records created by the criminal justice system, 
chiefly pre-trial depositions taken by coroners and magistrates but also inquisitions, recognizances, 
bills and indictments; trial reports published in newspapers, pamphlets and the Proceedings of the 
Old Bailey; police and government memoranda; professional literature such as legal and medical 
texts; other manuscript and printed sources including diaries, journals, letters, trade directories and 
obituaries. The Proceedings and depositions were used to construct a dataset of 2,615 cases of rape 
and especially homicide that occurred across the 22 counties studied (see Tables 3.1–3.4 in Chapter 
3). Thousands of individual documents were consulted so as to provide full details for each separate 
criminal case; and further research was done on hundreds of individual doctors named in the files, in 
order to develop a detailed picture of their medico-legal careers. All cases in the dataset were tried 
before the highest criminal courts in the country: the English assizes, periodic courts held around six 
circuits (each comprising five to eight counties) of which the Oxford remained unchanged 
throughout the period of study; the Welsh Court of Great Sessions, which was established in 1543 
and organised into four circuits; and the Court of Great Sessions of the palatinate of Chester 
(Cheshire). In 1830 Cheshire and the Welsh counties were absorbed into the English assize system 
and two new circuits were created: North Wales including Cheshire, and South Wales. Middlesex 
was not on any circuit: until 1834 crimes committed in the county or in the City of London were tried 
at the Old Bailey, or Sessions House, which was then renamed the Central Criminal Court and its 
jurisdiction extended to parts of Essex, Kent and Surrey. The Old Bailey thus became the assize court 
for these areas; it also gained jurisdiction over offences committed on the high seas or elsewhere 
abroad previously tried by the Admiralty.  
The records created by these courts are exceptionally rich, but a number of caveats should be noted. 
The nature of the surviving material means that direct quantitative and to some extent qualitative 




comparison between the years before and after 1830 is unfeasible. The criminal records of the Court 
of Great Sessions “are more comprehensive than their English assize counterparts,”86 but they do 
not include Monmouthshire, which was culturally part of Wales but administratively part of the 
Oxford Circuit, for which the surviving pre-1830 depositions are limited. Files for the twelve counties 
of the Welsh Great Sessions cover all known criminal cases up to 1830, catalogued from 1730 in an 
online database which includes trial outcomes. All of the assize and Great Sessions records were 
sampled. For the former, entire years of criminal depositions were read, including all surviving files 
to 1845, and from 23 of the following 69 years; for the latter, selections were made on the basis that 
the case file included depositions. The surviving criminal files for the palatinate of Chester are as 
voluminous as the Great Sessions material but are not catalogued or sorted; I therefore sampled 
twenty years between 1756 and 1824. For London and Middlesex, the digitised Proceedings of the 
Old Bailey provide the main source of data: the transcripts of thousands of trials held in the period 
1674 to 1913 (the year before my coverage for the other counties ends).87 Using the offence 
categories assigned by the project creators, all murder and manslaughter trials for London and 
Middlesex from 1700 to 1749 were included, in order to provide insight into medico-legal practice 
prior to and just after the important decade of the 1730s which, as we saw above, heralded the 
regular presence of medical witnesses and defence counsel.88 All trials for infanticide were analysed 
for the years 1700 to 1913, but its nineteenth-century allied offence, concealment of birth, was 
excluded because such trials were not fully reported. A broad sampling technique for murder trials 
after 1749 included the 1780s and then groups of years set apart by successively smaller intervals, 
taking in the crucial 1830s and similarly excluding trials that did not include actual testimony.89 All 
rape trials held at the Old Bailey after 1739 were examined but only those that recorded testimony 
— rather than a brief account of the verdict or legal arguments, were entered into the database; the 
last substantive entry is for a trial held in 1797 and only three cases after 1800 could be included.  
After 1830 the records for all parts of the country except London and Middlesex are incomplete: 
almost no cases of rape survive among the extant depositions; homicide files survive well but not in 
their entirety. Depositions in cases of rape-murder record medical evidence of both crimes, but my 
dataset is comprised mainly of homicides, with a small group of Georgian rape cases from London 
and Wales. Textbooks can fill some gaps from the perspective of professional literature, but it is not 
possible to study medico-legal practice in Victorian rape trials with the depth possible for homicide, 
a problem compounded by journalistic prudery: from 1796 a self-imposed censorship restricted the 
reporting of Old Bailey rape trials,90 and Victorian newspapers often claimed that the details of such 
cases were unfit for publication. But for homicide trials newspaper reports provide a vital source of 
information: they record, often verbatim, what people said in court. This includes the judge’s charge 
to the grand jury and summing up, barristers’ opening and closing arguments, witness testimony and 
cross examination, jurors’ questions, and any statements made by the accused. Using newspapers, it 
is possible to examine the reception of medico-legal evidence in the assize courts, to supplement the 
information provided by depositions and the Old Bailey Proceedings (the latter usually exclude the 
statements made by judges and lawyers). The provincial press delivers a voluminous source of crime 
news,91 particularly since the advent of online resource The British Newspaper Archive in 2011,92 and 
it is reliable. According to Judith Rowbotham and Kim Stevenson, the Victorian press can be used as 
a source of fact, information about legal roles, and public perceptions of crime and criminal justice. 
Legal professionals produced most of the court reporting: their detailed explanations were intended 
to reinforce a positive public awareness of the mechanics of criminal justice because “a legal system 




works effectively only when its operations have a firm basis in public consent.”93 Methodologically, 
nineteenth-century newspaper reportage offers precisely the detail needed to gauge the reception 
and impact of medico-legal evidence in the criminal courts, though some points may well have been 
left out or downplayed. Systematic searches were made for each case of murder and infanticide in 
two principal online repositories, Welsh Newspapers Online and The British Newspaper Archive, as 
well as general searches to identify individuals such as coroners and police surgeons.  
While the newspapers themselves may contain accurate trial reports, their use by historians is not 
without risk. Tim Hitchcock has suggested that, due to the problems associated with digitisation and 
optical character recognition, searches of online historical resources can be neither fully systematic 
nor entirely complete.94 Certainly it became evident that some online titles produce more legible 
search results than others, as do newspapers published after about 1890. Similarly, what might seem 
to be minor transcription errors in the Old Bailey Proceedings could be problematic because medical 
terms and doctors’ names were important pieces of information that were not always transcribed 
correctly. But in both scenarios the original documents were also available online and so all factual 
details were checked and newspaper reports of the same trial could be cross-checked. Trial accounts 
produced from shorthand notes for commercial purposes were also used, particularly when more 
than one edition was available for comparison.95 I would argue that the brevity with which medical 
evidence was sometimes reported suggests the extent to which it was considered an unexceptional 
part of the criminal justice process, as for example in this account of the trial of John Griffiths, who 
was executed in 1811 for wife murder: “Dr Howell and the former witness proved satisfactorily that 
the deceased was poisoned.”96  
The reliance on records related to a formal criminal charge suggests that the data has been shaped 
by two influences: the fact that a crime was reported and investigated as such by the authorities; 
and the use of medical evidence obtained on behalf of the prosecution by officers of the state, who 
generally had more resource advantages than the accused had. As social historians of crime have 
long acknowledged, assumptions about class and social status pervaded the justice system,97 while 
qualifications about the ‘dark figure’ of unknown or unreported crime are usually applicable,98 even 
in relation to homicide.99 However, my intention is not to calculate crime rates, which clearly are 
affected by the dark figure, but rather to identify medico-legal practice in the two types of crimes 
where we might expect it most frequently to be found and, given their capital nature, have the 
greatest potential impact on trial outcomes.100 Of course coroners held more inquests on people 
who died by accident or suicide than homicide, and the use of post-mortem examinations has been 
documented in such cases; but the findings suggest considerable regional variation, as well as a 
marked reluctance to resort to medico-legal examination in cases of presumed suicide.101 Indeed, 
under the terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1826 there was no requirement for coroners to take 
written evidence unless a charge of murder or manslaughter was likely to ensue,102 leading Pamela 
Fisher to note that “witness depositions rarely exist, other than for cases that went before the assize 
courts.”103 Meaningful results can therefore be obtained by comparing extant criminal cases: while 
the selected files reflect medico-legal work undertaken in a minority of all recorded crime,104 they 
relate to the most serious types of violence and so are a significant minority, typical of the routine 
use of forensic knowledge in felony trials. 
The inherent class biases of the past are less easy to dismiss: members of the working or labouring 
class far outnumber the middle or upper classes in the extant criminal records, with the exception of 




a few notable causes célèbres. It is entirely possible that, in the absence of a statutory duty to notify 
the coroner of cases within his jurisdiction,105 criminal deaths in respectable families went unnoticed 
or unreported. Coroners could order an inquest on a deceased person only after notification by a 
member of the public, and evidently used a selection process to separate the potentially criminal 
from the mundane cases. But to all intents and purposes selection began at the local level, with the 
family, friends, neighbours, doctors and constables who provided notification: they decided that a 
case was one for the coroner, based on obvious signs of violence, community suspicion, or even 
financial imperative. As we cannot study the records of the cases never subject to inquest or for 
which no witness statements exist, depositions in prosecuted cases offer the most consistent source 
of information on medico-legal work and the medical practitioners who carried it out. They afford a 
further analytical prospect, moreover, because barristers were usually instructed just before the 
assizes began and so sometimes annotated the witness statements, providing a summary of the 
main points of the prosecution and an indication of where the medical evidence was seen to fit. 
Additionally, the increasing presence of attorneys at inquests and committal hearings, questioning 
and cross-examining witnesses, sheds light on the issues that ignited disagreement or attracted the 
attention of defence counsel seeking to undermine the prosecution case.106 
One further methodological point must be borne in mind. Throughout the period under study, the 
criminal courts in Wales were in theory no different in operation than the English assizes, with the 
major exception of language. Office holders had to be bilingual, but in 1800 perhaps 70 per cent of 
the people spoke only Welsh;107 by 1900 this figure had dropped to about 15 per cent.108 The use of 
translators in court was commonplace, albeit their presence was not recorded systematically;109 so 
depositions have been doubly mediated, first by the process of translation and then by transcribing 
practices. Admittedly, this process remains largely hidden, but where revealed in depositions and 
trial accounts legal officials had evidently taken care to ensure an accurate record of what Welsh 
deponents and defendants actually said.110 Not only was this a legal requirement,111 but the speed at 
which legal proceedings occurred left little time for coroners, clerks or magistrates to put words in 
the mouths of witnesses.112 Deletions and insertions also suggest that depositions give an accurate 
account of pre-trial testimony, the purpose of which was to establish the facts of a case: surprises at 
trial were unwelcome and witnesses normally repeated the evidence contained in their deposition.    
 
Argument and Structure 
Local influences on medico-legal practice, and therefore on the emergence of forensic expertise, 
were crucial and included the investigations undertaken by coroners, magistrates and (after the mid-
nineteenth century) the police. The competence and zeal of local medical practitioners were also 
important. At the same time, local reactions took place in relation to national trends in the processes 
of criminal justice. This is why, for example, there was more variety of medico-legal experience in 
Glamorgan than in any other Welsh county: it was one of the few places in nineteenth-century 
Wales where the number of reported homicides might permit a doctor and the police to develop a 
degree of forensic experience; a growing population necessitated an extensive medical 
infrastructure; and rising crime rates led to the appointment of stipendiary magistrates. These sorts 
of demographic and structural issues help to explain the public dominance of London-based experts: 
London was where most of the institutions which tended to employ such professionals were located 




earliest and in the largest numbers, teaching hospitals and the Metropolitan Police being important 
innovators. Since there was no formal system for employing forensic practitioners and no way to 
become an ‘expert’ prior to the creation of specialist posts, legal officials consulted those who were 
close at hand. Expertise of the type we associate with modern forensic activity developed from 
hands-on practice that, for a small group, was combined with teaching or a hospital post; for others, 
it evolved from their role as a police surgeon. But this group of experts were the exception, not the 
rule.  
Medico-legal testimony in homicide cases was normally provided by local surgeons, who carried out 
some form of body inspection at the explicit request of a coroner or magistrate. This changed during 
the period of study, from simple external examination and wound measurement, to a more selective 
anatomization (opening only the evidently injured part of the body), to a full post-mortem in which 
both the body and brain were examined in order to identify a specific cause of death as well as the 
manner of death.113 Medical practitioners began to adopt a formal forensic language: by the 1830s 
references to ‘opening’ the body had largely given way to the term ‘post-mortem’. However, causes 
of death remained surprisingly vague and it is not clear that what practitioners claimed was a post-
mortem was in fact the full procedure implied by the term. The lack of a precise cause of death was 
especially problematic in cases of newborn child murder, when indeterminate medical evidence 
made deliberate killing impossible to prove.114 In most cases, forensic evidence was not the main 
form of proof: circumstantial and eyewitness evidence was equally if not more important.115 As late 
as 1886, for example, a Glamorgan man was convicted and executed for murder even though no 
post-mortem had been conducted. Given the deceased child was drowned and the killer caught 
within minutes this is perhaps understandable; but in an example of the locally contingent practices 
that this study seeks to uncover, the medico-legal work of the workhouse surgeon, appearing in at 
least his seventh homicide case, seems incomplete by the standards evident elsewhere at the 
time.116  
Few cases of homicide, even in the early eighteenth century, involved no medical witness at all; most 
towns and villages had a local surgeon or surgeon-apothecary, often more than one. Physicians were 
fewer in number and much less visible in the extant legal records: their focus on internal medicine 
rather than the external body-centred practice of the surgeon meant they were rarely the obvious 
practitioner for coroners or magistrates to turn to in cases of interpersonal violence. This began to 
change in the nineteenth century, most clearly in relation to questions of criminal responsibility, as 
psychiatrists sought to establish themselves as experts on mental derangement. They were 
preceded into the courtroom by the man-midwife, another area of medical specialism that found a 
ready entrée to the legal realm, displacing female midwives in the process. During the first half of 
the eighteenth century women had acted as medico-legal witnesses in cases of rape and infanticide, 
but over the next 25 years midwives were replaced by male surgeons, only some of whom were also 
man-midwives.117 The evidence drawn from two centuries of medico-legal practice shows that 
members of the medical profession supplied knowledge required by the criminal justice system; the 
following chapters investigate the nature of the exchange.  
Chapter 2 examines the place of forensic medicine in English medical education, to trace its gradual 
adoption into the curriculum: by 1831 it had become a compulsory subject for all would-be general 
practitioners. To identify what students were taught and could reasonably be expected to know if 
they were called upon in a medico-legal capacity, the chapter then uses textbooks and three sets of 




lecture notes to provide a detailed overview of the course content at four particular points in time. 
These include 1788, when Samuel Farr published the first English-language textbook of forensic 
medicine; 1836, when William Cummin delivered a course of lectures in London; 1869, based on 
lecture notes assembled by Thomas Scattergood at the Leeds School of Medicine; and 1900, when a 
medical student at the University of Edinburgh compiled a set of notes during his attendance at a 
two-month course taught by Professor Henry Littlejohn. Collectively, these sources support two 
arguments. Firstly, following the reforms of the early 1830s, the average British-trained general 
practitioner had access to a basic knowledge of forensic medicine and medico-legal practice, and 
was therefore not wholly unprepared to be called upon in a criminal case. Secondly, the somewhat 
disproportionate stress on infanticide suggests that the effort to control this offence was particularly 
relevant to the development of forensic medicine and the refinement of medico-legal practice. 
Chapter 3 presents a quantitative overview of the criminal cases on which the book is based, and in 
so doing identifies the different channels through which medico-legal testimony was obtained. The 
content and impact of such testimony, and how it changed over time, is examined using homicide 
cases to explain how surgeons met the needs of the criminal justice system as it evolved over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The focus lies on post-mortem examination of 
the dead: the main causes of death were head wounds, body blows, and stab wounds — injuries 
frequently inflicted in so-called fair fights or by domestic violence; crime historians have shown that 
popular beliefs about acceptable levels of violence helped to shape trial outcomes.118 Most of these 
cases were uncontroversial, however, at least in respect to the medical evidence: the cause of death 
was straightforward to identify and so expert witnesses were rarely needed. The chapter will also 
consider the role of insanity as a defence to homicide: prison medical officers emerged as recognised 
authorities on mental illness and crime in the 1870s, as a result of changes in criminal procedure 
initiated by government. Chapter 3 therefore tackles questions of typicality in medico-legal practice 
by considering the dataset in its entirety. The links between medicine, location and crime are also 
explored, via illustrative case studies of selected medical professionals who through their role as 
coroners or authorities played a greater than average role in criminal investigations. This chapter 
considers the development of institutions and offices as sources of medical expertise, particularly 
the medical officers to workhouses, prisons, asylums and hospitals; and police surgeons. It also seeks 
signs of recognised expertise through the use of cross-border consultation. In Wales, for example, 
this may have been related to geography but was more likely because the staff of the growing 
number of hospitals, medical colleges and universities were located mainly in England. For example, 
in 1876 magistrates in Flintshire sent a liver to be examined by the resident surgeon at the Royal 
Infirmary in Liverpool.119 Similarly, specialists located in larger regional cities like Birmingham were 
consulted by magistrates in Staffordshire and Shropshire.120  
Chapter 4 examines medico-legal practice in cases of infant murder. Mark Jackson has shown that 
the provisions of the statute of 1624, which presumed that a single woman who gave birth in secret 
to an infant later found dead was guilty of murder, made it increasingly likely that juries would 
expect to hear medical testimony “as to the cause of death and the possibility of still-birth.”121 This, 
combined with a growing interest in the body as a source of knowledge, meant that the inquest 
became “the major form of pre-trial inquiry into suspicious infant deaths.”122 The historiography 
tends to focus on the medically tricky task of establishing live birth and separate existence,123 or the 
social context of infanticide as a woman’s crime frequently brought to light by other women,124 but 
recently Elaine Farrell and Tim Siddons have pointed out the important yet under-researched role of 




the police in nineteenth-century infanticide investigations.125 The chapter combines elements of all 
three historiographical strands, to consider the medico-legal approach to infant murder within the 
context of the whole investigation. Thus, although doctors were primarily interested in the victim’s 
body, the focus of their interest varied depending on the infant’s age: different forensic approaches 
were needed for newborns and older babies, and laymen accordingly had different roles in revealing 
the crime. Moreover, many doctors took on investigative but value-laden and sometimes 
antagonistic roles in dealing with reputed mothers, using intrusive physical examinations to establish 
recent delivery,126 or reaching conclusions about sanity based on lay perceptions, often in relation to 
assumptions about unmarried women and always at the behest of the police, coroner or magistrate. 
The chapter therefore looks carefully at the changing content of medical evidence in cases of infant 
murder, as well as the medically-inflected comments of lay witnesses and the accused women 
themselves, and then turns to consider the presentation and reception of medical evidence in court. 
The trial notebooks of Samuel Heywood (1753–1828), chief justice of the Carmarthen Circuit in 
South Wales from 1807 to 1828, are used as a source of information about the structure and content 
of criminal trials, the judge’s prior preparation and attention to detail and, most crucially, the 
evidence presented and its interpretation. Many scholars have noted that doctors were reluctant to 
make statements that might lead to conviction, or were simply embarrassed by their ignorance in 
the witness box; but there were numerous instances where local surgeons were fully prepared to 
state that an infant had been murdered, particularly when the body showed signs of violence. It was 
up to the jury to make of that what they would, guided by the judge — who frequently pointed out 
that the pre-trial evidence was too weak to sustain a conviction. This chapter therefore uses 
medicine as a way to examine the history of criminal procedure revealed by judicial control of the 
jury. 
The final chapter considers the active role of medical practitioners in crime scene investigation, as a 
means of examining two related themes: the position and status of the expert witness; and the 
relationship between forensic medicine and forensic science. The distinction between them can best 
be expressed in relation to their principal concern or focus of interest: in forensic medicine, it is the 
body; in forensic science, it is things (which may be in, on or near a body).  The modern expert 
witness emerged in the context of nineteenth-century urban poison and insanity trials, when a 
strong link between expert status and professional status was established.127 But who deemed an 
individual to be competent to take on the role of expert, and how was that role acknowledged? 
Following a study of the on-the-ground work done by doctors at crime scenes and their use of 
scientific aids to investigation, the chapter will use financial data not previously reflected in the 
historiography to show that the attribution of expert status was locally determined. The notion of 
who was an expert was relative to who was not: trust and credibility were vested in medical 
professionals by officers of the law, and since most homicide cases were not mysterious but 
required only good attention to detail, local practitioners could act as experts. This chapter 
contributes to the historical interest in forensic science and scientific policing,128 but adopts a more 
practice-led than epistemological focus for the period before the First World War.  
While new in itself, the analysis presented here dovetails with a broader re-evaluation of eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century crime, policing and criminal justice practice that has been under way for two 
decades. However, its innovative examination of the contribution made by medical practitioners to 
the investigation and prosecution of violent crime goes further than the existing historiography, both 
in scope and detail: it demonstrates the longstanding and influential impact doctors in England and 




Wales had on the procedures of criminal justice, prosecution strategies, and jury expectations. This 
yields remarkable new findings about aspects of medical practice hitherto overlooked by historians 
of medicine, and offers criminal justice historians a fresh way to contemplate the professional links 
on which the criminal justice system depends. In bringing the various strands of the book together, 
the concluding chapter will review the main arguments and conclusions on the role of medico-legal 
practice in developing policing and courtroom processes, indicate their wider significance and 
ramifications, and discuss the several directions in which future research might usefully go.   
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